North Magnetic Pole

Northern Pole Of Inaccessibility

Geographic North Pole

Northern Sea Route (NSR)

Northwest Passage (NWP)

Arctic Circle

Introduction

Reflections from the Kola Coast

Hazardous Materials Wash Ashore in the Commander Islands, Russia

Bering Island, one of the Commander Islands, lies east of the coast of Kamchatka and west of the U.S. territories in the Aleutians. The only Aleut community on Russian soil and the only inhabited village on the Commander Islands is the village of Nikolskoye with about 750 residents, 300 of them Aleuts. The following is an account of an accident that should serve as a warning sign and an opportunity to examine the Achilles heel in shipping regulation and disaster preparedness, pointing the way toward policy changes to prevent worse disasters.

In July 2003, a 20-ton container filled with a hazardous chemical used in cement (tetratethylene glycol diheptanoate) washed up off the western coast of Bering Island, near the northwestern fur seal rookery and 15 kilometers from the local fishing grounds. The container, owned by the DuPont Corporation, was being shipped from South Africa to Korea and was lost at sea in March 2003. When the container was discovered on the beach, there was no disaster response plan in place. Individuals who got close to the container to examine it did not have any training in the handling of hazardous materials or the necessary equipment and clothes. They were poisoned and needed medical assistance.

The first attempt to move the container away from the area where tidal waves could throw it on the rocks and break it was unsuccessful. The container cracked and approximately 15 tonnes of the chemical leaked, creating a 400 square-meter oily spill. A later survey counted 46 dead birds and one dead seal. The Anchorage office of the Aleut International Association, after receiving first news of the accident, made a round of calls to maritime attorneys in an attempt to find legal counsel for the village of Nikolskoye.

Finally a firm with appropriate expertise was located in Juneau, Alaska. A telephone conversation, however, was abruptly interrupted by the news that the firm had been hired to represent DuPont.

DuPont provided funds for clean up, environmental assessment and some emergency response equipment. The nature and size of this work was mostly determined by DuPont itself. This particular accident was small, but it exposed potential problems. Governments may want to identify measures that can help prevent accidents and address response, especially in light of expected increases in shipping.

Non-commercial Partnership of the Coordination of the Northern Sea Route Usages

Formed in 2001, the Non-commercial Partnership of the Coordination of the Northern Sea Route Usages is a Moscow-based organization comprising federal and regional government officials,  Russian shipping companies and international research and/or educational institutions. Arthur Chilingarov, deputy chairman of the State Duma, is president of the Partnership with Mikhail Nikolaev, deputy chairman of the Council of Federation, as the vice-president. Captain Vladimir Mikhailichenko, former head of the Northern Sea Route Administration, is the managing director.

The organization has 32 members whose aim is to expand the use of the NSR, assist in safe navigation of Russian and international commercial use along the route, ensure adequate  environmental protection in the region, stimulate research and development activities associated with the route; as well as addressing issues such as tariffs, taxation, insurance and other  economic factors in the Arctic zone and the NSR. In order to incorporate the thoughts of the partnership members into the AMSA, partnership member Institute of the North, in conjunction with  the U.S. Arctic Research Commission, held a facilitated discussion during the organization’s quarterly meeting in St. Petersburg, Russia in February 2008.

The participants were asked what opportunities and challenges they anticipated for the Northern Sea Route in the next 20 years, or longer. The following ideas were captured during the 2 ½  hour discussion and placed into seven topic areas: Emerging Routes, Infrastructure, Technological Considerations, Development and Shipping Economics, International Cooperation and  Marine Environmental Safety, Training and Education and Arctic Ocean Observing Network/Monitoring. Concerning emerging routes, participants generally agreed that the intermodal  transportation system (rail and shipping) within Russia is poised to make “colossal” changes and that all Arctic shipping will be influenced by the developing intermodal transportation systems.

There was agreement that there will be a greater increase in the shipment of oil and gas of western Russia through the Barents and Norwegian seas, and that regional development in the Russian Far East could reasonably tie rail and shipping in the Lena River with Chinese products going into the Russian Far East and possibly natural resources going out. All of the participants agreed that economics, not Arctic climate change, will drive increased shipping in the NSR.

Infrastructure
When talking about infrastructure, the group agreed there is a need for better ice forecasting because ice is very difficult to predict. They envisage the icebreaker fleet in the future will be a mixture of a few large federal icebreakers and smaller commercial multi-purpose icebreakers to support offshore oil and gas development. They noted that shallow draft along the NSR coast  and inland rivers made access difficult and challenging; however, the European Union ARCOP project indicated winter marine access along the Ob’ River. The lack of major ports along NSR is  one limiting factor in increased shipping and is compounded by the need for port improvements throughout the North. The members were adamant there is a need for better search and rescue  resources deployed, as well as places of refuge identified. In addition, the capability of ships to provide assistance should be considered of prime importance, having due regard to the lack of  repair facilities, the limited number of dedicated towing ships available and the response time.

As to technology, the group said the likely future for shipping in the NSR will occur with independent icebreaking cargo ships and a small number of federal icebreakers used to facilitate traffic, if  necessary. ome members of the partnership believe there continues to be a need to maintain a federal icebreaker fleet, with the lead icebreakers of 100,000 shaft horsepower; while others  see a different role for a smaller icebreaker fleet that are used to assist, when needed, independent icebreaking cargo ships. Concerning development and shipping economics, some members suggested the NSR tariff structure needs to be evaluated with the goal of making it more competitive within the global maritime industry and economically sustainable. All operations, whether they are from within the Russian Federation or outside the country, should be subject to the same tariff structure. The group said redundancy of critical systems should be incorporated  into ships operating in the NSR. Government should work closely with and be supportive of regional commercial icebreaking systems and regional relationships in the Barents Sea region  (between nations and regional organizations) are important linkages for the future of the NSR.

Cooperation and safety
When discussing international cooperation and marine environmental safety, the partnership members agreed there is a need to address the key challenges in combating oil spills in  ice-covered waters. They called for the International Maritime Organization to create mandatory, not voluntary, regulations for all ships plying the waters of the Arctic and Antarctica. The  partnership plans to work with the noncommercial organization, Association Northwest, which includes 11 independent regions. They believe it is important that all ships in the NSR meet or  exceed the voluntary Guidelines for Ships Operating in Arctic Ice-covered Waters.

They also said that the Arctic environment imposes additional demands on ship systems, including navigation,  communications, life-saving, main and auxiliary machinery, etc. They emphasize the need to ensure that all ships systems are capable of functioning effectively under anticipated operating  conditions and providing adequate levels of safety in accident and emergency situations. In the training and educational area, they suggested ice navigation simulators are needed to improve  ice navigation and enhance marine safety. They emphasized the human factor is very important in all of these issues, but especially true when recruiting and training crew. Such training should  include knowledge of cold water survival gear and other unique issues crew may be exposed to while navigating in ice-covered waters.

As to the Arctic monitoring, the partnership urged support for a future Arctic Ocean Observing System, recognizing that a robust and effective Arctic Ocean Observing System is essential to  enhancing marine safety and environmental protection in the NSR and throughout the Arctic Ocean. They also supported obtaining reliable and detailed hydrometeorological and sea ice  information in the near-real time as necessary for supporting safe ship navigation.

Breaking the Ice: Arctic Development and Maritime Transportation

Organized by the Icelandic Government, March 2007

Hosted by Iceland's Ministry of Foreign Affairs in March 2007, the "Breaking the Ice: Arctic Development and Maritime  Transportation" conference provided the first opportunity under the International Polar Year banner for marine specialists and stakeholders to exchange information on Arctic shipping and the prospects of a trans-Arctic route between the North Atlantic  and the Pacific oceans. Designed as a contribution to the Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment, 90 delegates from all the Arctic countries, the United Kingdom, China and the European Commission discussed and debated issues on three key policy  issues: the future of research and monitoring in the Arctic, the status of emergency prevention and response and the viability of trans-Arctic
shipping.

The following are some of the observations made at the seminar:

• The extraordinary retreat of Arctic sea ice and the rapid decrease in multi-year ice has increased marine access throughout  the Arctic basin and coastal seas.

• The development of "double acting Arctic ships," equally fit for open ocean and navigation through ice without icebreaker assistance, opens the possibility of year-round trans-Arctic container traffic between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific oceans. A number of double acting tankers and containerships are already operating in the Arctic. The economics and icebreaking capacity of such ships improve with larger size.

• Improved remote sensing technologies will make it possible to provide information on ice thickness and ice ridges. The emergence of ice forecast services can be used for plotting sailing routes through the ice.

• The globalization of world economy and rapid growth in international trade has led to capacity constraints of the Panama and Suez canals, hampering the integration of North Atlantic economies with fast growing economies in East and Southeast Asia. Trans-Arctic shipping would supplement present transportation routes and spur economic development.

• The opening of a trans-Arctic route would enhance economic security of the world. Present transportation links between One presenter proposed the use of nuclear ships for trans-Arctic shipping to decrease the release of greenhouse gases and prevent the "graying" of the ice. Furthermore, nuclear ships would be relatively cheaper to operate in view of high and rising fuel costs.

• The participants agreed in general that Iceland could play a  role in the opening of a trans-Arctic sea route because of its location in the middle of the Northern Atlantic. The new shipping routes that pass near Iceland (routes of commercial ships from Northwest Russia and northern Norway sailing to North America) could be linked by Iceland serving as a hub for container traffic in the northern Atlantic region. The participants in the seminar concluded that experimental and limited trans-Arctic commercial voyages through the central Arctic Ocean could start during the summer navigation season within a decade; and that a year-round trans-Arctic marine transportation route between the North Atlantic and the North Pacific oceans could plausibly open in one or two decades, considering security, economic and environmental factors. the North Atlantic and emerging economies in the Far East are precarious. They are subject to delays because of accidents, mechanical breakdowns and maintenance, and they are vulnerable to disruption because of terrorist activities, regional conflicts and piracy.

• The high cost of technical development and infrastructure make it unlikely for private stakeholders to commence regular trans-Arctic transportation without governmental support.

• International cooperation for the development of trans-Arctic shipping should include stakeholders outside of the Arctic. Chinese delegates at the conference expressed a willingness to cooperate with the Arctic states in the research and development of Arctic shipping.

• Changing ice conditions may make it challenging to maintain  tight transportation schedules and ensure the punctuality of certain cargoes. Enhanced monitoring, improved sea ice information  and more efficient icebreaking carriers would significantly improve the situation.

• A comprehensive feasibility study is needed to estimate the commercial viability of trans-Arctic shipping, taking into account a wide range of economic and natural variables, including vessel  cost, ice conditions, sailing speed on different routes, etc. New shipping routes and technologies should be pioneered with experimental voyages in order to gather better information on the shipping conditions and viability of new shipping routes.

• Care must be taken to minimize environmental effects of increased shipping activity in the Arctic. The capacity of the Arctic states for emergency response must be increased with appropriate equipment, materials and sufficient towing capacity,  made available for various situations close to development sites and shipping routes. The Arctic Council can play a role in coordinating  response to emergencies related to the shipping through the EPPR working group.

• While voluntary or recommended guidelines for Arctic shipping have been adopted by IMO, the movement toward mandatory rules for Arctic shipping must be accelerated.

Trans-Arctic Container Vessel Shuttle Option

Using the most modern container vessel design for the Arctic, it is technically feasible to stablish a container traffic link between North America and Europe via the Northern Sea Route, a 2005  study concluded. The evaluation, funded by the Institute of the North and executed by Finnish-based Aker Arctic Technology, used ice operational simulations and only evaluated the feasibility of   vessel design, not the economic feasibility of the concept. Such economic analysis is still needed before a trans-Arctic shuttle operation can be considered as a serious alternative to today's  route via the Panama Canal.

Assuming twin trans-shipment ports in Alaska and Iceland, the study evaluated vessels that were 750 TEU and 5,000 TEU. The simulations were based on two different kinds of years, average  winter ice conditions and severe winter ice conditions, for both vessels. The evaluation used the double-acting operation design which allows the vessel to travel the traditional bow ahead in  open water and, by using a propeller system that turns 180 degrees, to go stern ahead in ice-covered waters. The 750 TEU Arctic container vessel for the study was a modified version of the Norlisk Nickel's Arctic Express, which moves nickel plate year-round and without icebreaker assistance between the ports of Dudinka and Murmansk in the Russian Federation (See page 82).

The theoretical study vessel was modified from carrying nickel plate to container storage both below and above deck. The design also doubled the size of the fuel storage due to the longer sailing required. The ship could ply the shallow waters near the coastline of northern Russia, but simulation runs indicated it would need some traditional icebreaker assistance in severe  winter conditions. The 5,000 TEU vessel used the same icebreaking design, just on a larger scale. While the larger vessel will accommodate more containers, the size and especially the draft  of 13.5 meters would prohibit it for use along the traditionally shallow-draft route of the NSR. While the study does not look at the cost of fairway fees in this scenario, it does note that the current  fee structure along the NSR is based on the paradigm of using icebreakers and "paying potential." Therefore, today the movement of natural resources along the NSR pays high fees whether  using icebreaker assistance or not. This type of fee policy is not suitable for cargo vessels that are capable of independent operations, as the fee should be paid if the icebreaker assistance is  needed, according to the study.

As noted, it is anticipated that the smaller study vessel would need icebreaker support some of the year, while the larger vessel would not. However, if the 5,000 TEU ship needed assistance it  would require two icebreakers due to the width of the vessel. Another issue the larger study vessel poses is the ability to travel outside the traditional NSR routes. Using only economic input  related to the cost of the vessel, the operational costs, the amount of cargo that could be delivered and other related issues, the transport cost from the Aleutian Islands in Alaska to a port in  Iceland via the NSR for the larger study vessel would be between $US354 TEU and $US526 TEU, and between $US1,244 TEU and $US1,887 TEU for the smaller container ship. It needs to be  noted again that these figures do not include all of the economic considerations that are needed to make an accurate evaluation, such as fairway/icebreaker fees, port infrastructure costs,  terminal and harbor costs and the cost to offload cargo onto the shuttle vessel, as well as transferring it back to an open-ocean vessel after reaching the twin port.

"All of these factors are unclear, uncertain and difficult to estimate," the study concludes. "Most adverse of them might be the fairway fees, of which a current estimate of $US900 to $US1,000 TEU can be given for traffic" in 2005. "The second could be the cost for building and running the terminals which could be in the same category as the cost of the vessels. Of course, the  terminals for the large and effective 5,000 TEU vessel are much more expensive than those for the 750 TEU vessel, but cost per container may be lower for the larger traffic volume. Of less  importance and even more difficult to clarify and estimate may be the feeder link cost. Even the existing system using the southern route includes feeder links to the container hub ports and how  this picture would be changed for the Arctic Shuttle Container Link remains to be clarified. However, it is expected that extra costs compared to the prevalent system could be created."

The Arctic Marine Shipping Assessment Recommendations

The focus of the AMSA is marine safety and marine environmental protection, which is consistent with the Arctic Council’s mandates of environmental protection and sustainable development. Based on the findings of the AMSA, recommendations were developed to provide a guide for future action by the Arctic Council, Arctic states and many others. The AMSA recommendations are presented under three broad, inter-related themes that are fundamental to understanding the AMSA: Enhancing Arctic Marine Safety, Protecting Arctic People and the Environment, and Building Arctic Marine Infrastructure. It is recognized that implementation of these recommendations could come from the Arctic states, industry and/or public-private partnerships.

Lessons Learned from the Manhattan Voyage

What had clearly been learned in the 1969 voyage were several basic Arctic icebreaking truths:

• A large mass moving at decent speed (our “model”) could break very tough multi-year ice and ridges, but it would need real backing power to prevent getting stuck, an absolute “must” if un-escorted tankers were to succeed.
• Maneuverability in ice is very difficult for a “parallel body” merchant ship shape even with bow bulges.
• Geared steam turbine machinery with new propellers and shafts could withstand the severe shocks that broken ice floes going through the propellers often caused.
• In near “open” water conditions, growlers and bergy bits were able to cause major structural damage in nonreinforced parts of the ship’s hull.
• Success of icebreaking tankers would be very much in the hands of a ship’s crew, even with reconnaissance by aircraft and side-looking radar, to find preferable routes though the ice. Most important was the conclusion supported by all who participated in the Manhattan voyage was that it is technically and economically feasible to use non-escorted large icebreaking merchant ships for the routes explored, and most likely also for the Northern Sea Route.

The Great Northern Expedition

In Russian history, the Great Northern Expedition refers to a wide enterprise initially conceived by tsar Peter I the Great. The tsar had a vision for the 18th century Russian navy to map the Northern Sea Route to the East. This vast and far-reaching endeavor was sponsored by the Admiralty College in St. Petersburg. In 1725, Russian explorers under the leadership of Captain Vitus Bering, a Dane serving in the Russian navy, made the first expedition voyage on Sviatoy Gavriil starting in Kamchatka and going north to the strait that now bears his name.

The major sailing of the Great Northern Expedition was undertaken between 1733 and 1743 through a series of voyages led by Aleksei Chirikov. The goal of the expedition was to find and map the eastern reaches of Siberia, and to hopefully continue on to the western shores of North America to map them as well.

The important achievements of the expedition included the discovery of Alaska, the Aleutian Islands, the Commander Islands and Bering Island; as well as a detailed cartographic assessment of the northern and northeastern coast of Russia and the Kuril Islands. The expedition also refuted definitively the legend of a land mass in the north Pacific. It also included ethnographic, historic and scientific research into Siberia and Kamchatka. When the expedition failed to round the northeast tip of Asia, the dream of finding an economically viable Northeast Passage, alive since the 16th century, was at an end.

With more than 3,000 people directly and indirectly involved, the Second Kamchatka expedition was one of the largest expedition projects in history. The total cost of the undertaking, completely financed by the Russian state, reached the estimated sum of 1.5 million rubles, an enormous amount for the period. This corresponded to one-sixth of the income of the Russian state for the year 1724. Because of its complexity and scale, the voyages became known as the Great Northern Expedition.

Despite the extreme hardships and numerous deaths, mainly from scurvy, the Great Northern Expedition represented a remarkable accomplishment in terms of organization, perseverance and courage. More so, it resulted in an outstanding compilation of knowledge. In tangible terms, the expedition resulted in 62 maps and charts of the Arctic coast and Kamchatka. It is interesting to contrast the general chart of the Russian Arctic resulting from the Great Northern Expedition with what was known of the Arctic coast of North America at the same date (by then William Baffin’s voyage round Baffin Bay had largely been forgotten or discredited and the only part of the Arctic coast reliably known and charted was that of the Hudson Bay and Strait)

Icebreaker Navigation in the Central Arctic Ocean, 1977-2008

One of the historic polar achievements at the end of the 20th century and early in the 21st century has been the successful operation of icebreakers at the North Pole and across the central Arctic Ocean.

Between 1977 and 2008 access in summer has been attained by capable icebreaking ships to all regions of the Arctic basin. Seventy-seven voyages have been made to the Geographic North Pole by the icebreakers of Russia (65), Sweden (five), USA (three), Germany (two), Canada (one) and Norway (one).

Nineteen of the 77 voyages have been in support of scientific exploration and the remaining 58 have been for marine tourism, all but one of the tourism voyages conducted aboard nuclear icebreakers.

Of the 76 icebreaker voyages that have been to the pole in summer, the earliest date of arrival has been July 2, 2007 and the latest September 12, 2005, a short 10-week navigation season for highly capable icebreaking ships.

The Soviet nuclear icebreaker Arktika, during a celebrated voyage, was the first surface ship to attain the North Pole on August 17, 1977. Arktika departed from Murmansk on August 9 and sailed eastbound initially north of Novaya Zemlya and through Vilkitski Strait to the ice edge in the Laptev Sea. The ship sailed northward to the pole along longitude 125 degrees east and reached the pole on August 17. Arktika arrived back in Murmansk on August 23 having sailed 3,852 nautical miles in 14 days at a speed of 11.5 knots.

The only voyage to the pole not to be conducted in summer was that of the Soviet nuclear icebreaker Sibir, which supported scientific operations during May 8 to June 19, 1987, reaching the North Pole on May 25. Sibir navigated in near-maximum thickness of Arctic sea ice while removing the personnel from Soviet North Pole Drift Station 27 and establishing a new scientific drift station (number 29) in the northern Laptev Sea. This successful voyage in the central Arctic Ocean could be considered the most demanding icebreaker operation to date.

No commercial ship has ever conducted a voyage across the central Arctic Ocean. However, seven trans-Arctic voyages, all in summer, have been accomplished by icebreakers in the central Arctic Ocean through the North Pole.

A voyage across the central Arctic Ocean with tourists was conducted by the Soviet nuclear icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz in August 1991. The Arctic Ocean Section 1994 Expedition, conducted by Canada’s Louis S. St-Laurent and the Polar Sea of the United States, was the first scientific transect of the Arctic Ocean accomplished by surface ship. During July and August 1994 both ships sailed from the Bering Strait to the North Pole and to an exit between Greenland and Svalbard through Fram Strait. The expedition made extensive use of real-time satellite imagery (received aboard Polar Sea) for strategic navigation and scientific planning.

Two trans-Arctic voyages with tourists through the North Pole were accomplished by the Russian nuclear icebreaker Yamal in summer 1996. In summer 2005, Sweden’s icebreaker, the Oden, and the American icebreaker Healy also made trans-Arctic passages in a second and highly successful scientific expedition by surface ships across the central Arctic Ocean.

Although not a trans-Arctic voyage, the operation of a threeship scientific expedition for Arctic seabed drilling during late summer 2004, mentioned earlier, is noteworthy. Included in the AMSA 2004 database, the expedition was composed of Russia’s nuclear icebreaker Sovetskiy Soyuz and Sweden’s Oden, both used extensively for ice management, and the Norwegian-flag icebreaker Vidar Viking outfitted for drilling. One of the key accomplishments was the return of a 400-meter sediment core from the seabed that is being used for scientific studies of past Arctic climates.

A review of these historic polar voyages indicates that marine access in summer throughout the Arctic Ocean has been achieved by the 21st century by highly capable icebreakers. The nuclear icebreakers of the Soviet Union and later the Russian Federation have clearly pioneered independent ship operations in the central Arctic Ocean, especially on voyages to the North Pole in summer. Conventionally powered icebreakers have also operated successfully on trans-Arctic voyages in summer, as well as on scientific expeditions to high-latitudes in all regions of the Arctic Ocean. Any planning for future navigation in the central Arctic Ocean would do well to understand the ship performance, environmental conditions and ice navigation capabilities of these successful operations in the ice-covered central Arctic Ocean.

Arctic Marine Tourism: A New Challenge

As passenger and cruise vessel traffic continues to increase in the Arctic, infrastructure and passenger safety needs will become of increasing concern. The large number of tourists already cruising Arctic waters now exceeds the emergency response capabilities of local communities (See page 172).

The Arctic’s cold air and water temperatures require the quick and efficient rescue of capsized vessels and tourists aboard lifeboats and rafts. Even limited exposure to cold weather and seas quickly reduces human endurance and chances of survival. These hazardous environmental conditions prevail in a region that has very scarce emergency response resources and where long distances result in lengthy response times. Emergency protocols become increasingly difficult as both small and large cruise ships seek remote wilderness settings and wildlife habitats. The primary polar attractions sought by tourists are rarely close to emergency response services. This combination of hostile environmental conditions and scarce emergency infrastructure is a serious threat to human life.

When performing search and rescue in the polar regions, there is an urgent need to respond quickly, as the prevention of injury and loss of life depends on timely response, prompt evacuation and the application of medical and other emergency response services. Effective responses can only be accomplished by the design and implementation of appropriate search and rescue management policies and programs, supported by appropriate physical infrastructure and well-trained personnel.

Ship evacuation produces a host of emergency response problems in the polar world. Passengers and crew must be sheltered from inclement weather, properly clothed, nourished and hydrated. The provision of these basic necessities in the polar environment, either sea or land, is formidable. The ability to successfully communicate a distress signal of any sort in the polar world can further exacerbate these threatening circumstances. Communications in the Arctic may be a challenge. However, ships equipped with adequate communication equipment (for example, digital selective calling-high frequency, or DSC-HF, and Electronic Position Indicating Radio Beacon, or EPRIB) are able to transmit distress messages.

It is not likely that communities located in the remote, high Arctic have sufficient medical resources to respond to illnesses involving hundreds, or perhaps thousands, of cruise ship passengers and crew. And given their histories, the indigenous people living in rural Arctic communities are understandably fearful of exposure to infectious diseases.

A dangerous consequence of the growing popularity and number of cruise ships operating in and transiting through polar waters is the significant increase of marine incidents. Serious marine incidents include sinkings, groundings, pollution and other environmental violations, disabling by collision, fire and loss of propulsion. Rapid increase in the number of cruise ship voyages has led to a similar increase in the number of incidents.

Given the large number of cruise ships and other recreational boaters currently operating throughout the polar seas and the probable growth of those markets, marine operators, Arctic governments and local communities are faced with significant management challenges.

Year-round Arctic Marine Transport to Dudinka in Support of Natural Resource Development and Production

Since the winter of 1978-79, one of the most advanced Arcticmarine transport systems in the Arctic has been the year-roundoperation comprised of rail traffic between the mines of the Miningand Metallurgical Company Norilsk Nickel to the port in Dudinka,on the Yenisei River and then the 231 nautical mile sailing toMurmansk, on the Kola Peninsula.

MMC Norilsk Nickel is the world’s largest producer of nickel andpalladium, and is among the top four platinum producers in theworld, as well as among the top 10 copper producers. MMC NorilskNickel is also a large global enterprise with production facilities inthe Russian Federation, Australia, Botswana, Finland, the UnitedStates and the Republic of South Africa.

Mining in the Norilsk area began in the 1920s. The region quicklybecame a critical supplier of non-ferrous metals within the SovietUnion. During the 1950s, the Northern Sea Route Administrationwas tasked with building a year-round Arctic marine transport systemon the western end of the NSR and into the Yenisei.

The development of large, nuclear icebreakers came first withthe Lenin in 1959 (world’s first nuclear surface ship) followed by asmall fleet of larger icebreakers of the Arktika class. These icebreakerswere designed to create tracks in the ice for lower-poweredcargo ships to sail in convoy astern of a lead icebreaker.

With unlimited endurance, the nuclear icebreakers could provideyear-round services in the deeper waters along the majorroutes of the NSR. Ice-strengthened cargo ships and shallow-drafticebreakers came next. By the 1978-79 winter season there wasenough icebreaking capacity to maintain year-round navigation byconvoying ships from the Yenisei west across the Kara Sea and intothe Barents Sea to Murmansk. A continuous flow of non-ferrousmetal concentrates could be maintained to smelters on the KolaPeninsula and to other industries in the Soviet Union.

During 1982-87 a new icebreaking cargo ship, the SA-15 orNorilsk class, was delivered by Finland’s former Valmet and Wartsilashipyards to the Soviet Union. Nineteen of these Arctic freighters(174 m length and 19,950 dwt) were built and several today remainin service on the route between Dudinka and Murmansk.

In many respects, the Norilsk class multi-purpose carriers revolutionizedArctic shipping in the same manner as the commercialcarrier M/V Arctic developed for the Canadian Arctic during thesame years. With high propulsion power (21,000 shp), the Norilskclass ships could operate under their own power as an icebreaker.These ships carried cargoes the length of the NSR in summerduring the late 1980s; during the winter they were used effectivelyto support the Norilsk-Dudinka operation.

Their proven capability for independent navigation through icefields without icebreaker support was a significant technologicalachievement, as well as a notable advance in efficient (and costeffective)Arctic marine operations. The successful operation ofthese ships was a harbinger of the future for Arctic marine transport.

In April 1988, a new, shallow-draft polar icebreaker namedTaymyr was delivered to the Soviet Union by Wartsila’s Helsinkishipyard. A single nuclear reactor was installed at the Baltic shipyardin (then) Leningrad, and the ship was ready for service alongthe NSR and in the shallow Siberian rivers by 1989. A secondship of the class, Yaygach, was added to the Murmansk ShippingCompany’s icebreaker fleet in 1990.

The design of this class represents the apex in the developmentprocess for the Soviet polar icebreaker fleet. Coupled in its designare Finnish advances in shallow-draft ship design with nuclear propulsiondeveloped in the Soviet Union. A draft of only 8 meters wasattained with Taymyr, which compares favorably with the average11-meters draft of the largest Soviet icebreakers of the period. Apower plant producing 44,000 shp provided a capability of continuouslybreaking 1.8 meters of level ice at a 2-knot speed. Thesecapabilities fit perfectly with the requirements for icebreaking (levelriver ice) on the shallow Yenisei River to the port of Dudinka; theseextraordinary nuclear ships could maintain an ice track out to theKara Sea through the winter in nearly all conditions.

Year-round shipping to Dudinka functioned throughout the1990s and the early years of the new century despite the financialchallenges facing the Russian Federation. MMC Norilsk Nickelwas restructured several times and since 2001 the company hasflourished, focusing on economic efficiencies, foreign marketingand potential investments. The marine transport component alsoreceived significant attention as the SA-15 Norilsk class ships supportingthe Dudinka run began to age.

The company’s marine operations department worked closelywith the Finnish shipbuilder Aker Yards to develop a new freighterclass that would be owned and operated by MMC Norilsk Nickel.The vision was for a fleet of five icebreaking containershipsdesigned for year-round operations. The first of the ships, NorilskNickel (168 meter length, 14,500 dwt, 650 TEU capacity), was completedin Helsinki early in 2006. The new ship is designed as a “double-acting hull” and is fitted with an azimuthing pod for propulsion.

The Azipod concept, as it is called, allows the ship to move sternfirst efficiently in the ice; the ship is designed to break 1.5 meter thick ice unassisted. In light ice or open water, Norilsk Nickel turns 180 degrees and moves bow first. Ice trials for the new ship were conducted in March 2006 in the Kara Sea and Yenisei River, and the vessel achieved a 3-knot speed continuously moving through 1.5 meter thick ice.

Norilsk Nickel has performed well in operating unassisted (without icebreaker escort or convoy) during its initial two years of service. With four more of the class being built in Germany, MMC Norilsk Nickel will have an operational fleet of five icebreaking carriers, all highly capable of operating independently through the winter season to serve the port of Dudinka. Safe and efficient, the Norilsk Nickel class ships represent a new concept of Arctic marine operations. They will enhance a regional, Arctic marine transport system in western Siberia and better link a key Russian commercial enterprise to world markets.

The Selendang Ayu Disaster in the Alaska Arctic

On November 28, 2004, after loading 1,000 of fuel and 60,200 of soybeans, the Selendang Ayu departed Seattle, Washington,with a crew of 26 along the North Pacific Great Circle Route bound forXiamen, China. Ten days later the 225-meter Malaysian-registered bulkcarrier broke apart off the rugged coast of the Aleutian Islands of Alaskaresulting in the deaths of six crew members, causing the crash of a U.S.Coast Guard helicopter and spilling an estimated 66 million metric tonsof soybeans, 1.7 million liters of intermediate fuel oil, 55,564 liters ofmarine diesel and other contaminants into the environment furthercausing the deaths of seabirds and marine mammals (See page 151).

A U.S. National Transportation Safety Board marine accident brief isthe basis for this report. Despite passing inspection by port authoritiesand U.S. Coast Guard officials prior to leaving Seattle, the seven-yearold Panamax class vessel encountered engine problems approximately100 nautical miles from Dutch Harbor, the closest place of refuge, andabout 46 nautical miles from the nearest point of land. After leavingport in Seattle, the ship had encountered heavy seas and between galeand strong gale force winds.

On his second transit of the Bering Sea, the vessel’s master, a citizenof India and a 32-year seagoing veteran, notified the harbormasterin Dutch Harbor via the vessel’s satellite phone he was having difficultiesand needed assistance. The Coast Guard immediately dispatchedthe cutter Alex Haley but because of the rough seas could only reacha top speed of 10 knots. Nearly six hours later, the cutter reached theSelendang Ayu and attempted to slow its drift toward the coastline byattaching a tow line to the vessel until the tugboat Sidney Foss arrived,which was then approximately 11 nautical miles away.

In the meantime, the wind and sea conditions continued to deteriorate.Arriving on scene, the tugboat master reported seeing theSelendang Ayu lying beam to the sea in 7.6-meter seas, hammered by45- to 55-knot winds. Some crew members were desperately strugglingto remain on the bow as the freighter rolled 25 to 35 degreeswith waves crashing over the deck amid passing snow and ice squalls.The remainder of the crew, some who had been up for some 41 hours,worked frantically to restart the engines.

On the scene, the Sidney Foss was able to slow the drift but unableto turn the stricken ship’s bow into the wind as the vessel drifted closerto the shore. A second tug, the James Dunlap, arrived from Dutch Harborwith sunrise 5 ½ hours away, noted the NTSB report. “Because of the seastate and the darkness, the masters of the Sidney Foss and the JamesDunlap decided to wait until daylight before attempting to swing thebow of the Selendang Ayu around by putting a line on the stern.”

Then, some three hours before sunrise, the towline parted andthe stricken vessel continued its now unabated drift toward UnalaskaIsland. At sunrise, with the Selendang Ayu picking up speed toward thecoastline, the ship’s master dropped anchor in hopes to slow or evenstop the drift. It almost worked.

The port anchor immediately caught, slowing and almost stoppingthe vessel’s drift. The feeling of relief was short-lived as some 15minutes later the ship began slipping its anchor under the unrelentingpounding of the growing storm and started to drift at 2 knots towardshore. The weather continued to worsen with steep seas of 6 to 7.6meters and periodic wind gusts of up to 65 knots, which occasionallypushed the waves to 9 to 10 meters. The Coast Guard suggested droppingthe starboard anchor, “but the Selendang Ayu master said the starboardanchor might foul on the port anchor’s chain,” the report stated.

Several attempts to reestablish a towline failed and with now fadinglight and its proximity to shore, the Coast Guard recommendedevacuating the crew. The master finally allowed a group of 18, thosehe considered the least essential for dealing with the emergency, todepart. Wearing lifejackets, but not the reddish-orange buoyant survivalor immersion suit that protects against heat loss and ingressof water, they would be extracted in two groups. (At the time of theaccident, the International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea, SOLAS,required a cargo vessel to carry at least three immersion suits for eachlifeboat, unless the vessel had a totally enclosed lifeboat on each side.The Selendang Ayu carried two fully enclosed lifeboats, one port andone starboard and was equipped with three immersion suits. In anamendment effective July 1, 2006 the SOLAS regulation was changedto require one immersion suit for each person onboard a cargo ship. Anexemption from this requirement for ships that voyage “constantly” inwarm climates is not allowed for bulk carriers.)

Using a USCG HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter that had arrived fromCold Bay, Alaska, the first group of nine Selendang Ayu crew memberswere hoisted from the rolling deck. Then only a mile from shore, theship’s port anchor was dropped. It caught. Shortly thereafter, a secondJayhawk helicopter hoisted the second group of nine sailors from theship. Eight crew members remained on board and continued to workfrantically on the engines. As darkness began to close in, the CoastGuard radioed the master and said they wanted to remove the remainderof the crew before sunset. Then came the first of several shuddersas the vessel ran aground on a small underwater shelf about 130meters offshore. Knowing the ship’s fate, the master radioed the AlexHaley and requested immediate extraction.

The eight remaining crew members gathered on the port bow,where the two previous evacuations had taken place. The vesselwas rolling badly in the shallow water and increasing groundswell.Another HH-60 Jayhawk helicopter was dispatched from DutchHarbor to the scene and a short time later the Alex Haley launched thesmaller HH-65 Dolphin helicopter. Both aircraft reached the freighteraround 6 pm with the larger Jayhawk helicopter performing the rescue.Fifteen minutes later all of the ship’s crew, save the master andthe USCG rescue swimmer, had been hoisted onboard when a hugerogue wave struck the bow of the freighter, sprayed up and engulfedthe Jayhawk. The helicopter’s engines stalled, spun around causingits tail and mail rotor blades to slam into the side of the crippled shipand crashed into the sea next to the Selendang Ayu’s forward port side.The Dolphin helicopter, which had been hovering close by, immediatelywent into rescue mode and quickly recovered the three-memberflight crew and the one Selendang Ayu crew member who survived the The Selendang Ayu Disaster in the Alaska Arctic88 ARCTIC MARINE SHIPPING ASSESSMENT | Current Marine Use and the AMSA Shipping Databasecrash. With no other sign of survivors, the helicopter headed to DutchHarbor.

While the master and the Coast Guard swimmer were awaitingrescue, the ship broke in two on the rocks. After three hours of beingbombarded by crashing waves, howling winds in total darkness, theship’s master and the USCG rescue swimmer were hoisted on board theDolphin, which had returned from its trip to Dutch Harbor. It was 10:35pm on December 8, nearly 60 hours since the Selendang Ayu enginesfailed.

Map 5.8 Accident location in Bering Sea. Inset shows route of Selendang Ayuthrough Unimak Pass, approximate point at which engine failed, path of vessel’sdrift without power, and site on Unalaska Island where it grounded.Source: National Transportation Safety Board.

The Nature of Ice at Sea

• Several forms of floating ice may be encountered at sea. The most extensive is that which results from the freezing of the sea surface, namely sea ice; but mariners must also be concerned with “ice of land origin” - icebergs, ice islands, bergy bits and growlers. Both icebergs and sea ice can be dangerous to shipping and always have an effect on navigation.
• Young ice: newly formed sea ice less than 30 centimeters thick. It forms extensively in the autumn as ocean surface temperatures fall below freezing and on leads that open in mid-winter due to shifts in the pack ice. It is not a significant safety hazard for most Arctic vessels although, when placed under pressure by winds or currents, it can impede progress.
• First-year ice: can easily attain a thickness of 1 meter but rarely grows beyond 2 meters by the end of the winter. It is relatively soft due to inclusions of brine cells and air pockets and will not generally hole an ice-strengthened ship operated with due caution. Under pressure from winds or currents, first-year ice can impede progress to the point where even powerful vessels can become beset for hours or even days. The Nature of Ice at Sea © Canadian Coast Guard
• Old ice: If first-year ice survives the summer melt season, it is then classified as old ice (subdivided into second-year and multi-year ice). It is typically 1 to 5 meters thick and is extremely hard. During the summer melt process, the brine cells and air pockets that characterize first-year ice drain out the bottom of the ice, leaving a clear, solid ice mass that is harder than concrete. Even ice-strengthened vessels are at risk of being holed by old ice. When under pressure, old ice can stop the most powerful icebreakers.
• Icebergs: are large masses of floating ice originating from glaciers. They are very hard and can cause considerable damage to a ship in a collision. Ice islands are vast tabular icebergs originating from floating ice shelves. Smaller pieces of icebergs are called bergy bits and growlers and are especially dangerous to ships because they are extremely difficult to detect.

The Origin of the AMSA

The Arctic Council Ministers in November 2004 in Reykjavik asked PAME to “conduct a comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined in the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance of Canada, Finland and the United States as lead countries and in collaboration with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council and Permanent Participants as relevant.”

Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment: PAME PAME is an example of the international cooperation that is a hallmark of the Arctic Council: while the PAME Secretariat is based in Akureyri, Iceland, its chairmanship in the spring of 2009 held by Canada.

Increased economic activity and significant changes due to climatic processes are resulting in increased use, opportunities and threats to the Arctic marine and coastal environments. These predicted changes require more integrated approaches to address both existing and emerging challenges of the Arctic marine and coastal environments.

PAME’s mandate is to address policy and non-emergency pollution prevention and control measures related to the protection of the Arctic marine environment from both land and sea-based activities, including coordinated action programs and guidelines complementing existing legal arrangements.

According to the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan, PAME aims to improve knowledge and respond to emerging knowledge of the Arctic Marine Environment. The AMSA is the primary action item for this objective. The plan also calls on PAME to determine the adequacy of applicable international/regional commitments and promote their implementation and compliance; and facilitate partnerships, program and technical cooperation and support communication, reporting and outreach both within and outside the Arctic Council.

At the 2004 Arctic Council ministers meeting in Iceland, the Reykjavik Declaration asked the PAME work group “to conduct a comprehensive Arctic marine shipping assessment as outlined in the Arctic Marine Strategic Plan (AMSP) under the guidance of Canada, Finland and the United States as lead countries and in collaboration with the Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response (EPPR) working group of the Arctic Council and Permanent Participants as relevant.”

The Origin of the AMSA Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response: EPPR The EPPR Secretariat rotates with the chairmanship of the Arctic Council and as such is located in the spring of 2009 at the Norwegian Coastal Administration, Department for Emergency Response, Norway.

Harsh conditions and lack of infrastructure in much of the Arctic create a higher vulnerability to emergencies than in more temperate climates. Consequently, prevention, preparedness and response must be adapted to Arctic conditions. Accordingly, international cooperation in this area is of major importance.

The mandate of the EPPR working group is to deal with the prevention, preparedness and response to environmental emergencies in the Arctic. Members of the working group exchange information on best practices and conduct projects (for example, development of guidance and risk assessment methodologies, response exercises, training, etc.). EPPR is not a response agency. In 2004, EPPR was directed by the Arctic Ministers to expand its mandate to include natural disasters.

Ongoing EPPR projects address oil pollution spill response in the face of increased Arctic shipping and development; technological support of radiological and other hazard assessments; and natural disaster response, particularly catastrophic river flooding.

Arctic Council

The Ottawa Declaration of 1996 formally established the Arctic Council as a high level intergovernmental forum to provide a means for promoting cooperation, coordination and interaction among the Arctic states, with the express involvement of Arctic indigenous communities and other Arctic inhabitants on common Arctic issues, especially issues of sustainable development and environmental protection in the Arctic.

The Arctic Council is comprised of Canada, Denmark (including Greenland and the Faroe Islands), Finland, Iceland, Norway, the Russian Federation, Sweden and the United States of America.

In addition to the member states, the council created the category of Permanent Participants in order to provide for the active participation of, and full consultations with, Arctic indigenous representatives within the council. Open equally to Arctic organizations of indigenous people with a majority of Arctic indigenous constituency, the Permanent Participants represent a single indigenous people resident in more than one Arctic state; or more than one Arctic indigenous people resident in a single Arctic state. The following organizations are Permanent Participants of the Arctic Council: Aleut International Association, Arctic Athabaskan Council, Gwich’in Council International, Inuit Circumpolar Council, Saami Council and Russian Arctic Indigenous Peoples of the North.

Working groups of the Arctic Council execute the programs and projects mandated by the Arctic Council ministers. Each working group, with its supporting scientific and technical expert groups, holds meetings at regular intervals throughout the year, ahead of the meetings of Senior Arctic Officials and Arctic Council Ministers. The six working groups include: Arctic Contaminants Action Program; Arctic Monitoring and Assessment Programme; Conservation of Arctic Flora and Fauna; Emergency Prevention, Preparedness and Response; Protection of the Arctic Marine Environment; and Sustainable Development Working Group